Wednesday, April 14, 2021

Devro ($DVO): An asymmetric play in the sausage casings oligopoly with 5% cash yield and a re-rating that could net 17% IRR through 2023

 

Executive Summary


I would like to present you Devro Plc, a UK-listed small cap company operating in an oligopolistic market under a disciplined leader (Viscofan $VIS). Thanks to great underlying trends in the collagen casings market (and more broadly in per capita meat consumption), especially in Emerging Markets, Devro offers a compelling investment opportunity where you basically get paid a 5% cash dividend for waiting for a re-rating to materialize, which I estimate could happen between the end of 2023. That scenario will net you a c.15% IRR through the end of 2023 in my base case where the stock re-rates from 10.4x EV/EBIT to 12.4x EV/EBIT, and up to 40% until through the end of 2023 in my "dream" case, where the stock re-rates to 15.4x EV/EBIT (still significantly lower than Viscofan $VIS).

Disclaimer: Long $DVO.

Investment Summary

Current Share price: 1.9£

Market Cap: 323£m

EV: 477£m

Expected IRR through 2023: 17% (base case) - 40% (dream case)

2020 Metrics:

  • Sales: 248£m
  • EBITDA: 57£m (23% margin)
  • EBIT: 36£m (15% margin)
  • Net Income: 29£m (9% margin)

Devro is one of the world's leading suppliers of collagen casing for food, used by its customers in a wide variety of sausages and other meat products. Devro is trading at a significant discount compared with the incumbent in the market, the Spanish group Viscofan ($VIS). In addition, the group is tightly managed and has an impressive track record in terms of cash generation and ability to detach a stable and predictible dividend to its shareholders.

The group is also benefitting from several tailwinds which are boosting the demand for collagen casings: shift from animal guts to collagen, growing protein intake in emerging markets (1/3rd of revenue), new products (meat-free sausages)...

Devro offers a compelling opportunity to benefit from a steady low-single digit growth in a countercyclical category, by betting on one of the main challengers trading at a considerable discount to the incumbent (Viscofan) that I don't view as justified.

Investing in Devro gives you the benefit of being paid a stable 5% cash dividend yield, with a free call option on the re-rating of the business arising from quick deleveraging (gearing ratio down from 6.7x Net Debt/EBITDA to <3.0x at the end of 2020, and potentially <2.0x by 2023).

Liquidity is not a problem with DSCR (Debt Service Coverage Ratio) near 7.0x, which is reassuring given that the liquidation approach is not the most flattering for this business (Liabilities Coverage Ratio at c.80% - after applying huge haircuts to fixed assets)

If Devro re-rates at a ~12.5x EV/EBIT multiple compared to ~10.5x today, a scenario that seems plausible, the implied IRR until 2023E is quite high, at 17%. In a dream case where Devro would mostly close the gap in valuation compared to Viscofan (which trades at 17x EV/EBIT), the implied IRR could go as high as 50% until 2023.

Business Overview

Devro is a world leading supplier of collagen casings and gels for the food industry. The industry is very concentrated, and one could describe it as an oligopoly, with the Spanish group Viscofan ($VIS) at the helm of it.

Devro's story started as part of J&J in the 1960s, and not much happened until the 1990s when following a Management Buy-Out, Devro was floated on the LSE to provide an exit.

Devro, listed in the UK is one of the incumbents, with £250m in sales and 2,100 employees around the globe. The manufacturing footprint has evolved a lot in the last 10 years, and Devro currently has production operations in six different countries over four continents (UK, Netherlands, Czech Republic, US, Australia, China). On average, c.3% of revenue is invested into R&D each year, and Devro has a very modern asset base!

Business Model

3Cs is Devro's new commercial strategy named "3Cs" for Customer, Core Profitability & Competencies. It was launched after a period of difficulties arising from a temporary excess of capacity compared to global sales, after capacity utilization dropped from 89% in 2011 to 74% in 2013, before recovering.

Source: March 2017 Investor Presentation

The objectives of the plan are the following:

  • Resume top-line growth
  • Improve margins by optimizing plants ("the hidden plant") and reducing costs
  • Strengthen competencies

Some material progress has been made since the announcement, through partnerships in the snacking sausages space, a premiumisation of brands and investments in the renovation of assets. All these efforts are already showing up in the group's financial data, with an upward trajectory since the beginning of the roll-out of the strategy.

What is Devro's Moat?

1) Leading position in core markets

Most of the companies in the casings space have been what they are doing for quite a long time, and Devro stays true to this image, with an history of over 85 years.

Devro benefits from this long history which allows the firm to have market leading positions in its most important geographies for sales of collagen casings:

  • Devro stands at the top spot in North America, Russia and East, Australia and NZ, and Middle East/Africa
  • It stands at the second place in Continental and Western Europe, Japan, Latin America and SE Asia

Source: Capital markets Day Presentation

2) Stability of meat consumption per capita... With upside potential in subcategories

The food industry is a stable sector overall, which can withstand most of the global economy's turbulences. The particular sub-segment which is relevant for Devro (meat products) also benefits from several trends (demographic growth, changing consumption habits in emerging countries, conversion from gut...) that help sustain the volume of casings, and even offer the potential of a lasting high single digit growth in subcategories such as snacking:

To illustrate, according to data collected by the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2020-2029, meat consumption per capital has gone from 32.6kg per capita in 2009 to 34kg per capita in 2019, a growth of 4.3% over 10 years. The average meat consumption is expected rise further to reach 35kg per capita in 2029.

On top of that modest growth overall, Devro is benefitting from a strong dynamism in particular subsegments such as meat snacks and sausages, which are growing at a faster pace.

3) A conservative financial structure & considerable margin of safety when it comes to debt service

Over the last 10 years, Devro has been leveraging up until 2016 (with Net Debt reaching 6.7x EBITDA) and deleveraging ever since (current gearing just below 3.0x). This financial debt was associated with important plant upgrades in Europe and Australia, as well as new facilities opening in the USA and China, which contributed to make Devro well equipped to reap the benefits of a modern industrial apparel.

In addition, it is important to note that this additional debt was not taken at the expense of the company's financial health, with the DSCR (Debt Service Coverage Ratio, or simply put EBIT/Net Int. Expense) sitting comfortably above 2 over the period. The only time it was not the case (2019) can be explained from a ~44£m writedown of company assets triggered by an acquisition and was essentially non-cash. At the end of 2020, the Interest Coverage Ratio was close to 7.0x, showing ample liquidity and margin of safety.

4) A Risk: Threat of replacement by non-casings technologies?

Significant conversion to co-extrusion could be an adverse effect on sales of casing, revenues and profit. Per the latest annual report:

More than 80% of the Group’s revenue is derived from the manufacture and sale of edible collagen casing, primarily for sausages. For many years, several manufacturers of machinery used in the food industry have been promoting “co-extrusion” systems for sausages which do not require casing. Both collagen and non-collagen co-extrusion gels can be used on such systems. In 2020 we have detected a greater readiness for fresh sausage producers to consider noncollagen co-extrusion solutions

Mitigation:

When there has been a conversion to co-extrusion in the past, Devro has been able to supply the collagen gel required for such technique. The group continues to invest in the development of innogative gel (non-casing) solutions as well.

5) Another Risk: Exposure to FX risk and variation in key raw materials (animal hides)

→ Devro has an exposure to key raw materials change in price. Cattle and sow hides represent up to 20% of the group's total COGS.

Mitigation:

The group has long-term contracts with specialized suppliers in various regions of the world

→ Devro's results are exposed to fx variations as the parent company reports in Sterling. In 2020, c.90% of the group's revenues were invoiced in currencies other than sterling.

Mitigation:

Policy of hedging a substantial portion of transactional foreign exchange risks for periods of up to 15 months using forward contracts

Business Strategy: Capitalizing on underlying market trends to expand market share

1) Collagen Displacing gut casings & inedible casings offers another growth opportunity on top of the global meat consumption growth

Source: Devro 2020 Annual report

Collagen casings, derived from animal hides, have been replacing gut casings at a rapid pace. According to figures published by the Collagen Casing Trade Association (CCTA), edible collagen represented only 33% of the total market value in 2010, but this share has grown to almost 50% (46% in 2020).

This displacement opportunity acts as a huge tailwind which creates an opportunity for specialized players in this niche market (such as Devro) to capture topline growth that vastly exceeds the c.0.5% per year that we found in the meat consumption figures.

As penetration approaches the 50% mark, and combined with the overall growth of the category, it makes the edible collagen casings category quite appealing in terms of growth potential, with a CAGR potentially reaching mid to high single-digit rates.

To illustrate the strength of the phenomenon at play here, if look at the growth in Collagen casings and gut casings since over the 2000-2018 period, we find the following:

  • Edible collagen casings volumes grew +45%
  • Gut casings declined -2%

The compounding effect of a growing category AND a displacement effect created a secular opportunity in the food products industry.

Source: 2019 Capital Markets Day

2) Opportunities in Emerging Markets: Devro's growth engine

Devros has a significant presence in emerging countries (Latam, MEA, Russia, China, SEA) which now represent close to 30% of the group's revenue.

Overall growth in sausage consumption in these grographies tends to be ahead of mature markets in line with GDP growth. The long term growth target is as high as 6-10% p.a.! 2020 showed an exceptional growth in Latam (+76%) for Devro. There are still pockets of nascent markets, with meat consumption still representing a luxury in mainland China and South East Asia, leaving huge pent-up demand from the growing middle class.

Emerging markets represented 28% of the group's revenue in 2020, up 300bps yoy. Therefore, a continued increase of the share represented by Emerging Markets in Devro's revenue would be a positive catalyst, boosting the group's topline.

3) Developed Markets: protecting the bastion and diversifying into dynamic categories

Devro has a strong position in mature markets, which still represent 72% of the group revenue in 2020. These countries offer various opportunities through the continued gut conversion to collagen casings, and the sustained growth in the meat snacks category which has been growing steadily at a c.6% CAGR. Another opportunity lies in potential partnerships with manufacturers of non-meat sausages, another category which has been seeing tremendous growth. Long-term growth estimates are sensibly lower than for emerging countries, though, with a range of 0-2% annually, and therefore Devro's ability to gain market share will be increasingly dependent on this ability to enter the right categories.

Valuation - Asymmetric opportunity with limited downside, stable dividend yield and free call option on re-rating

A DCF approach with topline growth slightly higher than market average (5% CAGR till 2025 to account for the conversion opportunity), an improvement of 100bps in EBIT margin and a ruthless 10% WACC gives a floor of ~8% downside compared with current prices.

Given the straighforward nature of Devro's activity, you don't have to be very creative to put together a DCF valuation. And you would not want to, as you want to your assumptions to be as realistic as possible!

A base case points towards an undervaluation of c.30%. It was done with an 8% WACC (quite punitive given the stock's 0.6 beta and 5.3% ERP) and the following assumptions:

  • A slightly above-market growth rate (5% CAGR to 2025) to account for Devro's ability to enter new verticals and tie together partnerships, as well as its positioning in edible collagen
  • Gradually improving EBITDA margin (from 23% in 2020 to 25% in 2025) to account for the cost-savings efforts and efficiency gains already obtained from the 3Cs strategy, while still leaving a big gap with Viscofan (market leader) which has margins above 27%
  • D&A driven as % of revenue and standing at 9% of revenue, the average over the 2015-2020 period
  • c.5£m of interest expense, not accounting for the savings allowed by the already foreseeable deleveraging (with guidance pointing to a leverage as low as 1.6x at the end of 2021)
  • 25% tax rate
  • Capex slightly superior to the maintenance figure given by management (£15m) to account for the fact that Devro already has a modern industrial apparel and can unlock further capacity from existing plants

Under these assumptions, even at the current prices (which have rallied since the 2020 trough), you can lock in a c.17% IRR if we model a normalization at the end of 2023

An approach through EV/EBIT multiples is also very encouraging. Devro currently trades at 10.4x EV/EBIT for 2023E, compared to c.17x for Viscofan ($VIS)

Should Devro re-rate at a ~12.5x EV/EBIT multiple compared to ~10.5x today, a scenario that seems very plausible if great results keep coming (especially from Emerging Markets), the implied IRR until 2023E is quite high, at 17% with a 1.5 year investment horizon. And this, while hitting 1.6x Net Debt/EBITDA only at the end of 2023.

If Devro manages to hit the guidance of 1.6x Net Debt/EBITDA at the end of 2021, the leverage could be as low as 1.0x in 2023, further boosting the IRR to c.25%

In a dream case where Devro would mostly close the gap in valuation compared to Viscofan and trade up to 15.4x EV/EBIT, the implied IRR could go as high as 40%.

One of the valuation where Devro is dismissed is the liquidation approach. By applying the following haircuts the the company's net assets:

  • Land & Buildings: -30%
  • Plant and Machinery, Motor Vehicles: -50%
  • Fixtures and Fittings, Computers: -50%
  • Assets in construction: -70%
  • Inventories: -50%
  • Receivables: -50%

... We find that asset coverage is only standing at about 75%, quite disappointing.

Thankfully, the Debt Service Coverage Ratio standing at >7.0x, that we already mentioned, acts as a strong line of defense before we lose our pants during liquidation!

Conclusion:

Overall, I find the valuation to be very compelling, especially given the stable, countercyclical end market, and the track record of dividend distribution that means that you're being paid a 5% cash dividend to wait for your call option on the re-rating to exercize...

Catalysts:

  • Re-rating following realization of guidance on net debt (target of 1.6x gearing by 2021E which I am not modelling as achieved until 2023) could boost IRR up to 25% in the base case with a 1.5 year horizon
  • Positive initiation of coverage by a major broker (only 5 analysts covering the stock at the moment) would likely reduce the mispricing
  • Special dividend if the company continues to deleverage and does not reinvest meaningfully above run-rate maintenance capex (c.£15m per year) given the modern industrial apparel
  • Acquisition by Viscofan which would instantly create value through the differential in multiples while allowing Viscofan to acquire a modern asset base - but unlikely given the probability of anti-trust issues

Saturday, March 13, 2021

[Quick Value] Pitney Bowes: The Mail King Born Again?


Investment Summary

 

I started looking at Pitney Bowes a few months ago, around the beginning of Q3 2020 and was interested in their massive balance sheet that caught my eye. I ended up reading around about the company's history and products, and ended up finding a compelling investment case given how little the market seemed to care about PBI's eCommerce activities. Now, after a 50% run-up, I’m finally taking the time to jot down a few ideas about the business, which I find fairly priced at the moment.

 

Basically, the way I see it, an accelerated ramp-up of the Global Ecommerce unit could unlock further upside if the EBIT run-rate (guidance of 8-12% EBIT Margin) is reached before 2026. Taking conservative assumptions on the other business lines by extrapolating long term trends, a 6-year timeline to normalization implies the stock is fairly priced at around 1.6$b market cap, with a normative FCF slightly higher than 150$m in my base case.

 

At current prices, the recommendation is thus a Hold. Closely monitoring the evolution of the different business lines post Covid to fine-tune my growth estimates and possibly exploit attractive entry points should the optics change materially in the next few quarters.                           

 

Despite the steep price rally around the announcement of Q420 results, I believe that the stock may have some juice left in the case of an accelerated ramp-up. Alternatively, it may come from a slower-than expected decline in SendTech, but I consider that scenario less likely.

 

Pitney Bowes in brief:

 

Pitney Bowes is a >100 years old company originally created by 2 business men, Pitney and Bowes (who could guess ?). The company was originally built around a single product, a metering machine for mail. Through the 20th century, the company had to adapt and managed to emerge as a technological leader in mail-related solutions, being at the front of successive innovation waves. At the end of the 50s, the group faced an antitrust lawsuit and was forced to offer free licenses for its products to competitors, but managed to stay afloat thanks to its commercial relations.

 

Between the 1960s and the 1980s, Pitney Bowes entered the Copy market, the payment terminal market, the leasing market, launched a partnership with Ricoh for photocopiers… With each iteration of its strategy, PBI chose to enter new markets by leveraging strategic partnerships to quickly reach scale.

 

Since 2000, the diversification strategy went into different directions, which have generated mixed results. The company tried to enter the CRM market and the software market, but ended up reselling those activities during the 2010s (2017 for the software activity).

 

→ The business is split in 2 main segments, Global Commerce and SendTech Solutions

 

SendTech Solutions is the legacy segment of Pitney Bowes, linked to mail-related activities. It encompasses different business lines. Technology Solutions offers different services for sending physical and electronic mail, parcels, buying supplies… The value proposition is to give professionals solutions to send, trace and receive mail and/or parcels. Some of these services are delivered through an open-platform which works with multiple service providers and allows the client to get the best price. The Financing unit leverages the group’s internal bank to sell metering machines through leasing. The firm also finances equipment from other firms, in a mix-and-match approach aimed at improving flexibility and client satisfaction over the long term. Support Services are delivered both on-site and online under the form of maintenance contracts. Not much details about the amounts, duration…

 

Despite the continuous erosion of the professional mail volumes, SendTech remains a very lucrative unit, with EBIT margins consistently above 30%. The online offerings play a major role in this success and saved the show during the worst hours of the covid crisis. As of Q2 20, as much as 2/3rd of supplies orders came in through the online platforms.

 

Global Commerce is the newest segment dedicated to ecommerce activities and the mail pre-sorting business. Inside this big unit, Global Ecommerce handles all activities linked to ecommerce.

 

This includes Domestic Delivery services, which combine a proprietary technology for parcel returns and a dense network of last-mile warehouses; Cross-Border Solutions, which houses a multitude of services facilitating international commerce; Shipping solutions, software solutions offered through APIs.These different businesses have been consistently loss-making, because of the need for scale to reach profitability. In 2019/2020, 4 warehouses significantly improving capacity have been delivered. This is the hidden gem, as we are talking about a 1.5$bn business that could reach a run-rate EBIT margin of 8-12% in the next few years!

 

Other than Global Ecommerce, Global Commerce also houses Presort Services, which is some weird combination between, SendTech and shipping. US Postal Services offer some form of subcontracting for bulk mail, where companies who bring them pre-sorted mail get a discount on the stamps that they can pass partially to their customers. Pitney Bowes is one of the main actors in this space and is able to gather enough mail on a daily basis to make it a profitable activity. Despite the headwinds that mail volumes face, the main actors in the space are still growing as they absorb the additional volume coming from smaller actors that are pushed out by the shrinking base. The profits from this activity alone were enough to finance the Ecommerce ramp-up in previous years, effectively making it difficult to read the profitability of the different segments.

 

Topline & margins guesstimates

 

Global Ecommerce is still in ramp-up phase as noted above. Current price in my opinion reflects a timeline of 5-6 years to reach the run-rate EBIT Margin of 10-12%.

 

Presort Services unit is caught in between opposite trends. Thanks to its extensive network, Pitney Bowes is still able to amass enough mail on a daily basis and is able to monetize the First Class Mail pre-sorting. Since First Class Mail has to be delivered every day, it eliminates competition from the smaller actors that may not reach the threshold to obtain a discount on some days, in turn making their clients more likely to go upstream to a bigger player… When it comes to Standard Mail, since it has to be sent every 2-3 days, smaller actors can still compete, but the steep reduction in mail volumes (-5% CAGR) is here also pushing the smallest actors out of the market. All in all, despite the volume fall, the strongest actors are still able to juice some organic growth out of this market by gaining market share :

 
Ironic effect of decreased volumes in the presort world is fewer clients and third parties have sufficient volume to achieve 5-digit densities, which is what drives economics in the presort world. Net-net, our Presort business is clearly going to exit this pandemic in a stornger market position” [Q2 2020 Call Transcript]

 

In total, I estimated a very low single digit growth (2% until 2022 and then 1% until 2026) and margins staying around the 3-year 2017-2020 average of c.13% for the pre-sorting business.

 

SendTech Solutions is the legacy activity of Pitney Bowes and thus a very mature activity. Margins are very steady but the business is facing a rapid decline (even though some could argue that there would be additional upside from a slower-than expected decline). I estimate the margins to be in line with their 3-year 2017-2020 average at c.32%. When it comes to the topline, my base case is again to take the 3-year decline CAGR of -6.5%. This is another figure that ought to be monitored closely, given that SendTech currently accounts for ~80% of PBI’s EBIT.

 

Main risks identified

-       Execution risk in Ecommerce: Ramp-up may never materialize, which could send the stock nosediving given the weight that future ecommerce prospects bear in the current price

-       The SendTech vulnerability: I talked about SendTech being another potential pocket of value, but I ventured less in this scenario as 1) I am sceptic about the probability of seeing the decline pace decreasing significantly and 2) I am also wary of the deeply regulated nature of the business (dependent on postal regulations and operations, on the contractual relationship with USPS)

 

Catalysts

-       In the short term, further re-rating when PBI starts getting viewed less as a mail company and more as an eCommerce company

-       Quicker than expected ramp-up in ecommerce profitability

-       Slower than expected decline in SendTech revenues significantly boosting FCF

-       Spin-off of the eComm activities which according to other investors having done the napkin maths could be worth ~$12 a share in standalone


Disclaimer : Long PBI